Drawing on case studies from two local authorities, this article identifies two distinct economic cultures in social care contracting. An armslength contracting culture was emerging in interaction with risk-averse commercial suppliers, while a 'partnership' contracting culture was developing in association with non-profit providers who actively sought risk and responsibility. The article explores the discursive construction of the distinct implicit contracts associated with the two economic cultures, showing that 'flexibility' had become a key trope in contracting debate, carrying complex meanings of both responsiveness and control. The article thus unpacks the notion of 'soft' contracting in social care, and argues that social care contracting should be understood as a process of mutual shaping of both a divided care industry and an internally divided local authority economic culture. The article then draws out a series of implications of the research for policy and regulation in care contracting.
particularly from anthropological and sociological work on organisational culture (Alvesson, 1993; Scott, 1995) . It also drew upon the evolutionary view of economic change that is increasingly influential in institutional economics (Hodgson, 1993; Hughes et al., 1997) .
The introduction of contractual and quasi-market processes into local government was associated with a sharp shift in economic discourse towards an imported language of business and markets. The research sought to explore how the discursive construction of shared and contested meanings of this language -as it was reworked by local authority staff and other participants in the reform process -shaped the extent to which particular types of quasi-market either became 'naturalised' as taken-for-granted (though not unproblematic) institutions or remained as explicitly contested economic processes.
Social care contracting was studied in both authorities. 2 In emergent social care markets, competition is substantial and growing Lewis and Glennerster, 1996) . The ragged and uneven development of private payment, charging and insurance in the social care sector (Ungerson, 1993) , plus the continuing importance of both charitable and social security payments alongside local authority community care budgets, mean that diverse 'purchasers' face a variety of public, nonprofit and commercial suppliers. Markets clearly exist in social care , but the continuing dominance of public payment, the role of public assessment, and the policy context of unease about how to ensure access to social care according to need, imply that exchange in these markets carries complex meanings for the participants which feed back on their experience and behaviour.
The two host authorities were both urban, facing considerable social deprivation, and under fiscal stress. The social care case studies covered contracting for domiciliary care, day care, respite and residential care, and an emergency alarm scheme. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff, from departmental directors in a 'slice' down to field level staff, and also with managers of contracting organisations.
Analysis of the interviews was interpretative. It identified shared and contested meanings of key terms, such as 'price', 'purchase' and 'contract', and then examined the use of these terms for discursive regularities, that is, consistent associations of sets of economic meanings. Interpretation also drew on recurrent metaphors and narratives in the interviews, and on documentation and observation of meetings.
The perspective on economic change developed in this way, which understands economic ideas as discursive knowledge systems external to individuals but constructed in context through negotiation, debate and reflection on experience, is distinct from conventional economic analysis of contracting which models contracts in terms of specified economic interests and objectives of participants. However, within recent economic work on contracting, there is a recognition of the importance of culture and meaning (Deakin and Michie, 1997) . 'Economic culture' in this research encompasses the repeated interaction between meanings of economic language and evolving economic behaviour. It is the economic aspect of broader organisational culture.
This article does not therefore offer a survey or typology of social care contracting, of which a number are now available (Walsh et al., 1997; Lapsley and Llewellyn, 1997; Wistow et al., 1996) . Its approach is closer to the case-based 'administrative anthropology' underpinning Lewis and Glennerster's (1996) research on community care implementation. It argues that two distinct economic cultures were becoming embedded in social care contracting in both authorities, each with their own discursive forms of shared understanding and legitimation. The divide between the cultures crossed the local authorities' boundaries, since emerging understandings of risk and responsibility within the two types of contract were shared between local authority officers and distinct groups of commercial and non-profit contractors. The divide was not associated in any simple way with a difference in what was being contracted for: both cultures were found, for example, in domiciliary care contracting. Instead, distinct contracting cultures were simultaneously shaping over time the social care industry, the precise product provided, and local authority contracting behaviour.
The article begins by discussing the concept of implicit contracting. Subsequent sections use discursive analysis to explore the contrasting economic cultures and analyse the associated implicit contracts. The final section draws out policy implications.
I M P L I C I T C O N T R AC T I N G I N S O C I A L CA R E
Economists, in modelling contractual terms, make three key distinctions relevant to this analysis. One is between instantaneous, one-off exchanges, sometimes called 'spot' contracts, and longer-term contracts. The second is between contracts that are complete -covering all possible contingenciesand incomplete contracts. And the third is between explicit contracts (whether written or not), and implicit contracts in the form of unstated understandings. No interviewees in this research analysed contracts using this technical vocabulary with these meanings. However, the distinctions are useful in identifying a clear analytical starting point: in these terms, social care contracts are necessarily incomplete and largely implicit.
A local authority contracts manager with background in commercial contracting explained why:
you have a great long list of things, and you specify it really tightly, and what you end up with -in social care contracts -is a series of loopholes, rather than something that you can say, well, this is actually going to form a framework and guiding principles for what we're doing … I mean, you can specify things too tightly, I think, and you end up causing more problems … I think with a social, social specification … and certainly in my experience it is true, you create um, not a regime, you create a sort of an atmosphere.
The hesitations, from someone otherwise assured, are relevant. He had learned through experience that in social care, written contracts were best left severely incomplete, and implicit understandings about standards ('atmosphere') had to develop over time.
In this context, interviewees struggled to attach a clear referent to the term 'contract'. For some, 'contract' meant 'formal' or written. Implicit understandings and working practices were not contractual. But others had come to feel that 'contract' could have a broader meaning. A local authority purchaser, referring to officers' support for voluntary sector development as 'partnership', said, 'I mean, partnership arrangements are contracts, where we actually share our skill resource to help stimulate and develop initiatives within the community sector.'
This article takes the broader view, and examines the nature of implicit contracting in social care. In doing so, it unpacks the concept of 'soft contracting' in social care (Lapsley and Llewellyn, 1997; Flynn et al., 1997) . 'Soft' or 'relational' contracting forms, defined as contracts predicated on trust and largely implicit, are widely recommended for care contracting Walsh, 1995) . This article analyses contracting based on two types of incomplete explicit contract: 'block contracts', guaranteeing payment in anticipation of a stated amount of care provision, and 'spot' contracts for the purchase of one item of service at a time, usually from a list of preferred providers. 4 As will be shown, both contracting types in practice required mutual trust, but they involved two distinct sets of implicit contractual understandings and two distinct strategies of legitimation.
B L O C K C O N T R AC T S A S PA RT N E R S H I P A S S E T S
Block contracting was expanding in social care in both authorities, and was strongly associated with the language of partnership, despite widely expressed doubts within the authorities about the desirability of block contracts. This section explains this paradox in terms of the role of block contracts as a financial asset. The next section examines the associated implicit understandings.
Block contracts commit an authority placing the contract to pay a given sum whether or not the agreed provision, defined in terms of hours of domiciliary care, or care for a given number of residents, or number of emergency alarm systems installed and serviced, is taken up. Such contracts do not differ in formal terms from a budget to provide a given level of service availability. Local authority contracts officers and purchasers, anxious not to (be seen to) waste money, therefore generally disliked such contracts.
Strong hostile views among social services managers included, 'the purchasers would be fools to sign up to [a block contract]'. One contracts officer held forth:
I hate block contracts with a passion. I think they are bad news … I think they tie you into a relationship you don't need, that isn't flexible. My principle objection, I have to say, is money. The -you end up buying, paying for things you don't need.
However, both authorities were actively developing block contracting, not least the contracts officer who expressed such hatred. One reason given was reducing monitoring and invoicing costs, but the main theme was that block contracts were associated with more desirable working relationships. Most interviewees involved in block contracting used the language of 'partnership' and service development; for example one social services manager argued that:
it is easier to work in a creative and innovative partnership with people if you have got a small block contract and guarantees of a certain level of work, so they feel quite satisfied … I think that having a partnership contract rather than a straightforward contract keeps the developmental edge on it.
This kind of discursive slide from an explicit block contract to a looser notion of a 'partnership contract' can be explained by the role block contracts play as local authorities' financial contribution to partnerships. While in the 1980s local authorities often contributed land assets to partnerships, legislative constraints on the transfer of land below market value and pressures to divest property had largely cut off that avenue by the mid-1990s (Horton and Mackintosh, 1993) . No interviewee used the word 'asset' about a block contract, but the financial guarantee of a block contract was widely understood as an asset contributed to collaborative ventures.
For example, here is a local authority contracts officer (whose language reflects an estate agent background) discussing the funding of residential care provision:
I was just having a pow-pow with one of the business managers at [commercial bank]. We were talking about residential homes. He said there was no way the bank would lend on them.
Why not? Caught a cold with too many of them … Their position may have changed, but he said it a couple of times, he said, we would only do it if the council would guarantee the business. By a block contract? Yes.
The authorities were therefore structuring block contracts to act as investments for the purposes of developing services. The contracts officer who expressed 'hate' for block contracts had just created such a 'pump priming' contract with a small organisation:
We'll say, look, tell us what your break-even point is on this: say X pounds. We will pay up to that, and we will pay six months' block, in advance, so you've got some operating capital, you're not going to get hammered … for bank loans.
The up-front payment helped establish service provision by people who 'would like to come into this, but can't capitalise it'. It was, he agreed, a sort of cross between grant and contract funding, written into an contract based on a business plan.
This strategy, of the block contract as bankable capital, had got a number of social care partnerships under way, thus reinforcing the increasingly taken-for-granted association between this explicit contractual form and active working relationships. The partnerships included two housing-with-care schemes, in different authorities. Such schemes provide very sheltered housing, with 24-hour wardens and domiciliary care based on the premises. They aim to support people with quite high levels of physical dependency and confusion in their own homes. In both cases, the land was provided by a housing association partner. A mixture of Housing Corporation and commercial finance had funded the building, based on anticipated rents from tenants. A block contract for domiciliary care financed the hiring by the association of a stable group of carers. A local authority contracts officer explained:
It's a partnership between us and the housing association. The housing association owns the land and we had the cheque book for paying for the domiciliary care. What we were doing is letting a contract for two years for someone to come in and provide domiciliary care to these people ... and the amount of service people get obviously varies.
A third partnership, providing a local emergency alarm system including emergency visits, was constructed on similar financial principles but the other way around: the initial block contract was from a housing association. The control centre accommodation was provided by the association, which also guaranteed to pay, each quarter in advance, for a given number of alarms in their own sheltered housing. The association also 'supplied the typist' who got the data onto the system. The partners shared the capital costs, and the authority employed the staff. In 1995 the authority subsidised the budget from NHS joint funding, but about 80 per cent of the revenue came from individual private charges for the alarms and from the association. Both partners expected that once the authority went over to a full purchaser/provider split, it would provide a block contract for referrals from Social Services. The two block contracts, plus the revenue from charges, would then, the manager hoped, support a stable group of mobile care officers.
These partnerships were not formally incorporated joint ventures, but fall rather into the industrial category of 'co-operative agreements' (Mariti and Smiley, 1983) . They had required substantial physical investment, and were intended by all the parties to be long term. Steering committees drawn from the partners oversaw the project managers. The physical assets were owned mainly by the non-profit partner, even when the local authority employed the staff. This structure gave the non-profit partner considerable negotiating leverage but not exclusive control. The local authority input was understood to be important in terms of both revenue funding and legitimacy. As the schemes developed, the levels of control and the working relationships were established through experience. In this process of defining these implicit understandings, including the search for an appropriate language for defining the problems, 'flexibility' turned out to be a key discursive trope.
'FLEXIBILITY', R I S K A N D R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y
It's something about -can you, in terms of providing social care, or health care, work to certain levels of pre-defined efficiency which the market demands? Or must there be an area of flexibility and latitude, that caters for changes in the pattern of need, requirement, or changes in levels of risk?
The word 'flexibility' recurred constantly in the interviews on social care contracting. Two voluntary sector managers putting together housingwith-care schemes used 'flexible' or 'flexibility' thirty-two times between them, quite unprompted, and local authority policy officers and purchasers, as well as contracts officers quoted above, also used the words frequently. The discourse of 'flexibility', a dominant theme in the management, industrial and welfare state literature of the last two decades (Best, 1990; Burrows and Loader, 1994) , has spread widely as an acceptable way of talking about struggles for control and also about attempts to bring together social needs and 'market' survival.
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This section examines what can be learned from the discourse of 'flexibility' about implicit partnership contracts in social care. The interviews
suggest that the attraction of the discourse of 'flexibility' is that it can be made to carry two key associations at once: responsiveness (to need) and (managerial) control.
For example, both housing-with-care schemes had found on starting up that their initial tenants did not have the envisaged high levels of need for care. Highly dependent and vulnerable people were unlikely to move; instead people with lower needs would move in, then stay as their needs increased. One scheme had as a result found itself with a group of highly vocal tenants who thought they were being overcharged for care and were refusing to pay.
A local authority policy officer reflected that the problem had arisen because the care was intended to be 'flexible': people should get what they needed as they needed it, much as they might in residential care, rather than just so much per week at fixed times unless reassessed. That had resulted in charges above the average local domiciliary care charges, plus a fixed overhead charge for the dedicated team. The tenants saw this as paying for what was not (yet) needed.
So the charging had to be changed, said the policy officer, to 'a more flexible approach where people really pay for the care they get'. This would mean, he thought, paying more per hour for personal care, a lower charge for domestic help, and no fixed charge apart from the fee for the warden. Discussions were continuing with the very active tenants' association: they want to pay what they individually get, so we've got in some quite difficult discussions which aren't fully resolved yet about what counts as chargeable care. You know, does the fact they sort of see someone in the corridor and ask them to come in and change a light bulb, does it mean that there's a tab running? 'Flexibility', then, means here both getting what you need and paying for what you get, and debate continued on the scope for aligning the two.
For one voluntary sector manager, 'flexibility' was even more of a term of art. His association had spent a 'couple of years' thinking through the 'concept of this kind of continuing care, flexible care'. This began with a 'flexible building, that allowed people to age with grace and dignity'.
I said, look, we need to come up with a flexible design that allows me flexibility in terms of providing care over a number of years, um, as people shift both the building and the care pattern need to shift.
Here too, 'flexibility' means response to need, in the physical building and the services in it. But note the 'me'. 'Flexibility' also means the control necessary for 'me' to offer that responsiveness.
One aspect of this control was the ability to allocate staff time in the scheme, without very detailed monitoring. All the partnerships found local authority assessments and reassessments of clients too slow. In practice, the housing-with-care scheme managers shifted staff around between clients without accounting for every five minutes' worth of time spent, as one manager explained: they [the authority] said, you know, within this 450 hours is x number of hours for domiciliary, and x number of hours for personal care, and there's also x number of hours for night care … Well what we've done, having got that, we've actually now tweaked it ourselves internally. They said, well, provided the bottom line is right they don't really care … I would rather have a block contract which gives me the flexibility to deal with it in a direct style.
Another voluntary sector manager made the same point: 'the actual management of the contract is very much up to the [care] co-ordinator', so if, say, less than the contracted cleaning hours were provided in one week because of staff sickness, 'we wouldn't have to go back to the local authority and say, we owe you two hours; we give it to them another way'.
Voluntary sector interviewees thus associated flexibility with different types of financial control. One manager noted that the broader the financial base, the more flexible it is. The diversified non-profit group in which he worked gave 'flexibility within the group' to provide a range of services, thus keeping the activity in-house. The more complex the community care partnerships, the more flexible, because of the capacity to 'vire money across', so if a local authority contributes, 'you put that into the pot and then the pot adds up to a lot more than you can provide … it's flexible enough…' With enough such flexibility, perhaps the voluntary sector could alter staff working boundaries too: 'maybe a different type of care provider, that'll have to come too, give us a bit more flexibility across the whole spectrum'.
So 'flexibility' here indicates an ambition to manage an integrated system of care -and expresses a widely held perception that this is only possible outside from the public sector. Owning the land added to the leverage. As 'landlord', in principle the association could say to the authority, if negotiations went wrong, 'stuff your care contract, if you aren't prepared to fund it we'll just do it as a sheltered scheme'. The local authority contracts officer for the scheme explained the resultant constraints:
With things in which land is involved, and somebody owns the land, there is an immediate imbalance in bargaining position. Because I can't come onto your land unless you say I can. So if I turn round and let a care contract for a continuing care housing scheme, and you as the landlord said 'Well I know you let it, but I'm not letting them on. They're not coming on my land, oh no.' Um, you've then got problems. So one's person's flexibility is another's constraint. A purchaser worried that he was being forced by contracting to focus on the 'core business' of high dependency care purchasing and emergencies. He felt this was short sighted, and wanted to look at: what scope there is for partnership arrangements with, um, community groups, voluntary sector organisations … There's the traditional flexibility within the voluntary sector that enables an area of provision that's not at the centre of the hard core… Hence, he suggested, some grant funding should be retained; even block contracts were too tightly specified. Putting all the funding through contracts was 'not giving us the flexibility and breadth of thinking'. So here 'flexibility' is about control in a different sense: being able to think long term, not to be focused on 'formal, er, delivery of services'.
The hesitations are again relevant. It was hard for the local government interviewees to think against the tide of conventional wisdom which said, paying for immediate outputs is the best and least risky use of funds. But the voluntary sector interviewees had no such inhibitions. They sought block contracts to increase their autonomy. They were not risk-averse: they coped with risk by spreading their funding sources, owning assets, having a financial fall-back position as landlord, and being part of a diversified group.
The voluntary sector managers were also strikingly willing to take on policy development, intervention and management. They saw themselves as taking a quite high profile role in developing long-term care, including pressure on the statutory sector locally and nationally. They told many stories about trying to get local authority policy-making to work: co-ordinating between people in different departments, providing draft contract specifications when the authority had none, trying to get officers to take a flexible view of the registration rules, or pressing for rapid assessments of clients. The emergency alarm manager did his own financial assessments for charges to individual applicants -otherwise, the work pressure on social workers would have destroyed the partnership after April 1993 -and seemed unworried by the political sensitivity of this. They and the local authority officers interviewed agreed that the authorities were being forced into short-term thinking, and that it was in the voluntary sector partnerships that some responsibility for the long term might be attained.
This means that the implicit understandings within the partnerships have policy relevance. Since the public sector was committing revenue funding, the written block contract was for one year, its renewal always subject to local government funding constraints. Nevertheless, both sides saw it as a long-term commitment. A 'mortgaging' effect on the community care budget -in the words of a social services director -arose because there was emerging an implicit contract in these partnerships which went well beyond the formal contract terms.
'FLEXIBILITY' I N A R I S K -AV E R S E C O M M E RC I A L S E C TO R
There was in the social care interviews a second 'flexibility' discourse quite distinct from that just outlined. This too contained meanings shared by local authority officers and outside managers, and was particularly associated with discussions of care contracting with commercial providers. In this discourse, 'flexibility' was explicitly aligned with what some local government managers called 'business freedoms'. A purchaser already quoted moved between both discourses. He sought to remain 'flexible' in terms of choice between suppliers, and gave this example of responsiveness to purchasers' requirements: 'there's an agency that is developing a very flexible response using technology, so you purchase your care in units that might be down to five minutes, and add them all up and at the end of the week you have a weekly bill.' Staff 'flexibility' was closely related to this: commercial firms were viewed by purchasers as being more flexible providers than in-house units because they insisted on staff working more unsocial and fragmented hours. In-house provider managers retorted that purchasers wanted two incompatible things: 'flexibility' in the sense of just buying exactly what they wanted, and 'flexibility' in the sense of reliable spare capacity to be turned to in emergencies.
The commercial sector interviewees used the word 'flexibility' as the mirror image of buying just what you want: supplying what you are paid for. The marketing manager of one large firm providing domiciliary care (who relabelled himself the 'field support manager' when talking to local authorities) put it this way: 'all the care in the community contracting is really an extension of private patients at home, because that in effect is what they are. It just so happens they aren't paying their own bills.' Given that premise, 'flexibility' was used by this interviewee in a wholly consistent way. Block contracting was 'inflexible' because it reduced 'choice' on both sides. Conversely, spot contracting from an approved suppliers' list with agreed prices was desirable because 'flexible'. 'I would rather do spot contracting because … it means the company is not so much under duress to meet every aspect of what is required of them … you can say "No, I can't manage that one."' He thought he should be able to turn down difficult clients. Refusing, he said, 'becomes contentious if you have a block contract'.
Another aspect of 'flexibility' was that all this firm's staff worked as selfemployed, so 'if we haven't got hours to give people to work, we don't have to pay them, it's as simple as that'. (He also argued that this suited staff, who could choose when to work.) This was a bone of contention with local authorities, who, he said, were 'covering their backs':
If there is a catastrophe, who is legally responsible? It falls back on them since they are the buyer of the service. Whereas when they are giving it to a large direct employer then they are passing responsibility? Yes, that's right.
The firm did not want this kind of responsibility, nor did it want financial risk. The manager complained that the authorities wanted him to quote a rate per hour, including travel, while the firm preferred a labour payment plus expenses formula since it was a less 'risky calculation'.
The other commercial firms interviewed, providing both domiciliary and residential care, were smaller, and might have been expected to be more interested in the security of a block contract, but they too saw a trade-off with being able to refuse work. The managers and owners interviewed all saw themselves as supplying a standard service and competing on price, as agencies. One owner wanted continuity of contracting, but not too much cash up front. None wanted any involvement in policy. The large firm did not want 'collaboration', just better communication: 'they pay us and we are their suppliers' but he did not feel listened to on contract detail: 'they always say, 'we want this to be a collaboration … the next thing you know the documentation comes out and they have taken no notice at all'. Nor did he present the firm as seeking any national policy influence, despite its size.
The contrast with the voluntary sector managers could hardly be sharper. No commercial firm manager used the words 'partner' or 'partnership', though one small firm owner talked of working in a 'team' with local social workers. Each sector understood block contracting and 'policy' responsibility to go together; one sector sought this control -and called it 'flexibility' -while the other rejected it as too constraining and conversely characterised sales of individual units, on price, as 'flexibility'. In each case, the notion of flexibility was linked to an image of the clients: in the commercial case, as 'private patients', in the voluntary sector case, as clients and residents with changing needs.
I M P L I C I T C O N T R AC T S I N A D I V I D E D S O C I A L CA R E I N D U S T RY
These two discourses of flexibility, associated as they were in these two authorities with different types of provider organisation, 6 express key elements of two different types of emerging implicit contract in social care. The implicit contracts are the shared understandings about proper contracting behaviour, and mutual expectations that such behaviour will be adhered to, that stitch together both partnerships and stable spot commercial contracting. New implicit contracts can be expected to emerge from a mix of pre-existing cultural norms in the contracting organisations; explicitly calculative behaviour in pursuit of perceived individual and organisational interests; pursuit of established and newly developing routines; and mutual learning about the likely behaviour of other parties. 7 The focus here is on the way in which the convergence of contracting parties on new 'contract cultures' (a widely used phrase in the interviews) involves new shared meanings of concepts and behavioursalmost, new common languages. The discursive development in these case studies was markedly self-conscious, based in reasoned ideas about language and behaviour.
8 Implicit understandings about proper contracting behaviour for both parties differed sharply between the two types of contracting. Explicit 'spot' contracts were generally framed by what a policy officer called the 'full contracting process'. This required a formal specification, competitive tender, and selection of the authority's preferred list of contractors. This was generally accepted as the best procedure because it employed open criteria and appeared even-handed.
However, once the list was established, the spot contracting process differed sharply from the economists' model of 'spot contracting' as one-off, arms-length exchanges (described above). Rather, the process involved repeated contracting between the same parties in conditions of severely incomplete information. The commercial suppliers, despite rejection of 'collaboration', recognised that a spot contract for care of an individual brought associated implicit commitments, not least because the contract once agreed was often quite long term, for example, a place in a private residential home, and people's needs change. A local authority contracts officer saw this from the purchasing side: 'for services that are personal services to a client our negotiating position is not very strong once we have let the contract … the bottom line is, well, are we really going to move the client?' No, he concluded, generally not if the client is frail and elderly. In this context a single explicit contract in practice trails clouds of implicit relations and obligations involving particular clients.
So even with 'spot' contracting the authority has to rely on the professionalism and probity of the residential home owner. Exactly the same is true of 'spot' contracting for domiciliary care, where authorities cannot monitor private carers closely and depend on the quality standards of suppliers.
9 'Spot' contracting of this type is therefore understood by both parties as 'relational'. The 'relational contracting' concept refers to the terms of a repeated working relationship that are not only implicit but also cannot be fully specified in advance. Implicit relational contract terms include a commitment by the parties to seek to sustain the relationship (Kay, 1993; Macneil, 1978 Macneil, , 1980 . Hence, commercial firms may calculate that it is worth building up a reputation for reasonable quality provision, since this will help it to sustain market share, and purchasers may calculate that they can bank on that calculation by the supplier. These 'reputation effects' can operate in social care so long as there is some evidence of quality and a reasonable choice of supplier.
Other implicit elements in these commercial contracting relationships, identified above, included the interpretation of 'flexibility' as 'exit'. The shared expectations had come to be that buyers considered what suppliers had to offer, and expected suppliers to provide the type of item repeatedly required; suppliers expected no embarrassment if they refused a difficult or very demanding client.
One social services manager noted that this type of commercial supplier saw certain market segments as undesirable, notably high dependency levels 10 and products (such as respite care) where spare capacity is essential. They had set out to provide those services in-house: 'we have cornered the market for respite care purposely, going out to do the things that er, we know they can't compete with'. This is a strategic decision, designed to protect some in-house provision and expertise. Such spot contracting and market niche strategies are quite distinct from partnership approaches.
In 'partnership contracting', a policy officer noted that tendering processes can become problematic. In housing-with-care, the housing association contracted not only with the authority, but also with care providers selected by the council, creating a 'licence to occupy' for those providers. The 'association's financial backers' needed to be satisfied that the selected providers were reputable and compatible with legal constraints on housing associations' rights to contract. These 'legitimate pressures and demands on our partner agencies' constrained the list of companies who could tender, and had implied 'quite a learning curve' for the authority.
Reputation effects do enter into implicit partnership contracts, since a partner will wish to be seen as a desirable potential partner for others. But the openly long-term intentions of the partners in these schemes required stronger efforts to resolve conflicts and to sustain the relationship. Conflicts in these schemes therefore offer clues to the development of implicit contract terms during the 'learning curve'. Three poles of debate around which the implicit contract was developing were relations with clients (including charging), relations with competitors, and the role of partners in policy-making. Around these inter-related issues, changing ideas and expectations could be traced which were consistent across the partnership case studies.
One such shift was towards the non-profit partners accepting a greater role in charging policy and for collecting charges, for example for emergency alarms. In the housing-with-care scheme conflict over charges, the housing association had started from the view that charging was 'a local authority responsibility' 'not a landlord's duty', to be resolved between the client and the 'local authority as the assessor and also the funder'. The local authority took the same view initially, unilaterally designing a means-tested charging system which was 'a hybrid between residential care and domiciliary care'.
However, when the tenants began to withhold payment and refuse care, the partners had to collaborate to sort it out. The local authority rethought its charging policy in conjunction with the association, and undertook shared negotiations with the tenants, including involving them in interviewing potential care providers. The association accepted that it had to play a role in charging policy. Both partners knew that the scheme needed a minimum uptake of care for financial viability; both partners had to deal with the tenants' 'animosity'. So, the association manager reflected, both had rethought their roles in a more collaborative framework:
Well originally … the association had a member of staff on site. And there was obviously someone provided by the care provider as well. The aim of that originally was [a] division between landlord's duties and care duties if you like … When we actually got to the reality of the thing it became very clear that the two were getting too close.
The proposed solution was to bring 'the two together as one post' and to agree to find a way round the complications of funding that post. Furthermore, the local authority put in extra funding while the charging problem was resolved, and the association agreed to renegotiate a block contract which had overpaid for the hours of care taken up. So the emerging implicit contract involved 'flexibility' in the legal sense used by Macneil (1980) : a willingness to renegotiate the explicit contractual elements if circumstances shift.
A final implicit element of the partnership contract was the authority's recognition that the housing association was constrained by its need to compete for funds. The associations were jostling for position in the housing-with-care field, and a successful joint venture with an authority offered them a competitive advantage. The local authority knew that they risked being trapped into working 'collusively and anti-competitively', and getting locked into weak negotiating positions within partnerships. They were, however, increasingly accepting that risk in search of provision for their residents that they could not otherwise fund. Where a diverse industry -in this case commercial and non-profit care provision -is itself growing and changing rapidly, the contracting process shapes the industry itself as well as the local authority's contracting behaviour.
There are a number of implications for policy. First, authorities should not assume that they are dealing with wholly pre-existing industrial cultures and objectives.
11 Their contracting behaviour influences the shape of the social care 'industry' and its culture. Furthermore, early contracting behaviour has great influence. The process outlined here of the developing and 'setting' of a wave of new organisations with their own cultures at an early stage of a particular market and industry's developmentorganisational structures and cultures which then become hard to break up and reform -is familiar from industrial history (Stinchcombe, 1986) .
Second, however, authorities have less general freedom to set contracting policy than the linear policy-to-implementation models that dominate the contracting literature suggest. Policy on explicit and implicit contract terms develops in practice through interaction and the setting of new contracting cultures. Implicit understandings may be unwritten, but once established are costly to break. Implicit contracts express the sharing of control between contracting partners.
Third, this small set of case studies suggests that an industrial divide is shaping itself in social care around two distinct types of implicit contract. Each draws on overlapping vocabularies of contract, invested with distinct sets of meanings, as the analysis of the flexibility discourses was designed to explore. The distinct economic cultures examined coincided in the study authorities with the divide between the commercial and nonprofit sectors of the 'care industry', not with a division between categories of services purchased.
Fourth, each type of implicit contract blurs the purchaser/provider divide, but in different ways. Thus, in the 'spot' contracting framework, quality control and assessment of clients have both shifted substantially towards providers. This was acknowledged by both contracting parties in practice, but contradicted the explicit purchaser responsibility for quality and assessment. Furthermore, the discursive framework of contracting, emphasising choice and 'exit', and the reluctance of commercial contractors to take on any explicit policy role, made it hard to shape -or even debate -a policy framework that would reinforce the necessary ethical behaviour by providers.
The partnership model's implicit contract addressed those problems at the cost of creating others. It brought out into the open and accepted the increasing role in quality determination and policy of external providers. It clarified the long-term nature of the commitment to clients, and increased services by bringing in new funding sources. The new problems related to issues of probity and market power: providers were explicitly influencing aspects of the purchasing role, such as tendering lists and allocation of funds. This made probity harder to demonstrate, and blurred the line between collaboration and collusion.
Fifth, the problems and policy risks at the heart of both types of contract culture centre on the relation between the contracting process and the clients' experience of the services. Neither contracting culture is designed to ensure clients' involvement and access to information, since both are centred on the relation between buyers (the authority) and suppliers. And both tend to restrict broader public access to information, on the grounds of various types of competition-related confidentiality.
Consideration of these implicit contracts therefore suggests, finally, that effective policy-making would be assisted by a much clearer distinction between purchasing activity and regulation of care contracting processes. At present the two are conceptually intertwined in policy thinking. Regulation can be thought of as rule setting and intervention that shapes the outcomes of purchasing activity. Both cultures need an injection of legitimate regulatory action that recognises the extent of provider leverage -of different types -and designs ways of opening them up more to client pressure.
With 'spot' contracting, in the context of financial constraint, clients' interests can be severely in conflict with those of both purchasers and providers. Clients and potential clients therefore need a voice independent from the purchasers. The explicit framework of competitive tendering, assessment and monitoring does not achieve that. Regulation which recognised that need, and understood the implicit framework of repeat contracting, would have to focus on creating more effective advocacy for clients' information and rights in relation to the main providers, independent of the purchasing function.
For 'partnership' contracting, a regulatory framework barely exists so far. It needs to recognise that in the implicit partnership contracts, nonprofit partners are becoming, not so much agents of the public sector, as joint policy-makers. Local authorities have externalised some political as well as financial risk. An effective regulatory framework needs to develop mechanisms of openness and accountability, such as requiring yardstick comparisons with other suppliers, organised accountability to clients, and public information about charges and levels of provision. It would centre on developing more open processes of partnership governance, where clients had more say in choosing partners and managing provision, thus opening up to challenge potentially cosy inter-organisation relationships.
N O T E S 1 ESRC grant no. L311253050; see acknowledgements.
2 Other case studies were drawn from catering, leisure services, financial services and internal 'trading' within the authorities. 3 Walsh et al. (1997, pp. 48-9) confirm that these are general features of social care contracting. 4 This meaning of 'spot' contracting differed sharply from the economists' definition given above. 5 Mackintosh (1999) discusses the discourse of 'flexibility' across all the case studies in this research. 6 Walsh et al. (1997, pp. 47-8) found most domiciliary care contracts in their sample were block contracts with the voluntary sector, and residential contracts were mainly 'spot' contracting; since much residential care is for-profit, this bears out the association here between type of supplier and type of contract, but with contracts differently distributed across 'products'. 7 Empirical research on contracting increasingly recognises that both culture and calculative activity shape economic behaviour (Kay, 1993; Lyons and Mehta, 1997) . 8 The interviews generally began by discussing cases, then moved to language and concepts.
Interviewees were, however, intensely aware of the discordant nature of contracting language in care contexts and eager to discuss it. 9 The reliance on producer control of quality in domiciliary care spot contracting is examined in Mackintosh (1997) . Lewis and Glennerster (1996, p. 107) note the impossibility of closely monitoring domiciliary provision. 10 There are exceptions to this generalisation: as prices for standard services are driven down, some commercial care suppliers are moving into higher dependency provision, for which they can charge considerably more. 11 Discussion with participants in the Voluntary Sector Studies Network particularly helped to clarify this point.
